Hong, Kubik and Stein (JFE 2008) find that the price of a stock in the US is decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of listed firms in a region to the aggregate personal income in the same region ("RATIO"), an "only-game-in-town" effect. We first replicate the HKS (2008) study using European data and find an opposite effect, a "game-hoarding" effect. We then investigate the underlying factors of RATIO and find that after controlling for differences in origin of law, investor rights, corruption and Euro adoption, neither a game-hoarding effect nor an only-game-in-town effect is strongly supported in the European case. The results are important in understanding the concept of local bias in a crosscountry framework.
Introduction
The general portfolio theory prescribes an efficient market where all investors hold the same portfolio of assets. Assuming that markets are completely integrated, there should be no effect of borders, legal systems or personal preferences on investment choice. Harrison Hong, Jeffery D. Kubik and Jeremy C.
Stein published a paper in Journal of Financial Economics in 2008, "The only game in town: Stockprice consequences of local bias", hereafter "HKS (2008)". They find that local bias has implications for stock prices on the US market. Conceptually, HKS (2008) divide firms into visible and non-visible firms and investors into local experts and generalists. The assumption is that generalists can only invest in visible firms and local experts can only invest in visible local firms and non-visible local firms.
Given the presence of non-visible local firms and local experts, the ratio of the aggregate book value of listed firms in a region to the aggregate personal income in the same region (RATIO) is expected to have a negative impact on the market-to-book ratio. HKS (2008) find that the price of stocks in the US is indeed decreasing in RATIO. Dividing the US market into nine Census regions HKS (2008) find that you would experience an increase in stock price of up to 7.9 percent when theoretically moving a firm from the Middle Atlantic region to the Deep South. They attribute this effect, an only-game-in-town effect, to a simple matter of local supply and demand.
We replicate the HKS (2008) study using European data and expand the framework to a cross-country framework. Our simple replication of the HKS (2008) study using data for the EU15 1 countries show the opposite effect than the one found by HKS (2008) . We find a game-hoarding effect in which the
Local bias and home country bias
In theory we would expect to observe an efficient market where every investor holds the market portfolio. However, the international equity market is segmented (Chaieb and Errunza, 2007; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; among others) . Segmentation leads to different risk adjusted values of identical investments on different markets and challenges traditional portfolio models.
Home country bias is a concept that refers to the tendency of investors to invest more in firms situated in their home country. This effect is documented by Coval and Moskowitz (1999 and 2001 ), Huberman (2001 , Ivcovic and Weisbenner (2005) among others. In the search for a rational explanation of home country bias in equity portfolios some obvious reasons could be institutional barriers, the added cost of cross-border trading or higher taxation of foreign income. However these effects are not large enough to explain the magnitude of the bias (e.g. Uppal, 1992; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994) .
The increased focus on local bias can partly be explained by the dominance of US research in the field of finance. The US market is large and diversified so it makes sense to investigate if the home country Game hoarding in Europe: Stock-price consequences of local bias? _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 4 bias can be found on a regional basis, having effectively removed any separate effects of investor protection and the overall legal system. In addition, the rejection of the hypothesis that country specific factors are the explanation of the home country bias naturally leads to the conclusion that other reasons must be found. Those reasons, such as information asymmetry, may as well be investigated on a regional basis. Coval and Moskowitz (1999 and 2001) support the view that information asymmetry drives local bias.
They look at fund manager performance and find that fund managers who specialize in local firms earn abnormal returns. The findings are stronger for older, smaller funds situated in remote areas and for stocks in small firms. Similarly, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and Ivkovic (2008) show that private investors may also be trading locally because they have an information advantage. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find that households investing in local stocks earn superior returns compared to the households investing in non-local stocks. Since the findings are more significant for small firms that are not in the S&P 500, information asymmetry is assumed to drive this superior return on local stocks. Ivkovic (2008) takes the investigation of the source of superior return on local stocks a step further. On average households investing in the stock market underperform but the households investing in fewer, local firms as opposed to the households holding a well-diversified portfolio perform better. This indicates that these households have a better stock picking ability than the well-diversified households.
According to Guidolin (2003) home bias is rational and explained by learning giving local investors an information advantage. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008) also support the idea that learning drives bias. They assume that investors choose what to learn and argue that you will always earn more knowing what others do not. Therefore it would not be rational for an investor from one country to try to get much information about a firm in another country. They assume that there would already be others with similar or even superior information. Therefore the home bias is completely rational. Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) argue that the advantage of local analysts is stronger in countries where rules on disclosure are weaker, institutional investors are less important, corporate ownership is more concentrated and where accounting information is less informative. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find that the co-movement in local equity is not explained by fundamentals, and they propose that a word-of-mouth effect may be the reason. Their findings are more significant for small firms with more individual investors and in regions with less financially sophisticated residents.
However, they do not interpret their findings to suggest that information asymmetry drives the investment. They propose that investment behavior is driven by familiarity. They suggest that investors may trade in the same way simply because they talk to each other and not because they analyze the firms' performances. The results of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) support the existence of the wordof-mouth effect for both professional and private investors. Brown, Ivkovic, Smith and Weisbenner (2008) also document the word-of-mouth effect and shows that the tendency of neighbors to influence stockownership is stronger in more sociable communities. They find a multiplier effect in the stockownership in the community suggesting that whether the neighbor participates in the stock market or not is the deciding variable. Huberman (2001) supports this view. He claims that people invest in the familiar and often ignore the principles of portfolio theory. To support this claim he looks at the trading strategies of people investing locally. Generally people follow a buy-and-hold strategy and do not sell or buy stocks prior to the values falling or rising after announcements. This indicates that they do not trade on information advantages, implying that comfort rather than rationality drives the local bias. A factor that also contributes to the local bias is the tendency to invest part of a firm's pension plan in firm stock and the fact that employees often invest in the firm they work for (Huberman, 2001 ).
Game hoarding in Europe: Stock-price consequences of local bias? _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 6 3. Methodology HKS (2008) find that the market-to-book ratio is decreasing in the ratio of the total book value of listed firms in the region to the total risk tolerance (= aggregate personal income) of investors in the region (RATIO). The equation below is the main equation of the HKS (2008) study and is also the basic equation of our study:
+ β 4 R&D Dummy + β 5 SIC Dummies + β 6 Exchange Dummies where Log (market-to-book):The logarithm of the quotient of the market value of the firm's equity divided by the book value of the firm's equity
RATIO:
Total book value of all listed firms headquartered in the region divided by the aggregate personal income of all households in the region.
ROE:
Net income of the firm divided by equity of the firm.
R&D-to-sales R&D costs of the firm divided by total sales of the firm.
R&D dummy Dummy coded as 1 if the firm reports research and development expenses and 0 otherwise.
SIC dummies Dummies for SIC codes (Standard Industrial Classification codes).
Exchange dummies Dummies for firm listing (NYSE, Amex or Nasdaq).
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Our study is based on data for the EU15 countries. The main argument for choosing the "old" EU countries (EU15) is that a common (long) history of EU membership accommodates some of the concerns of HKS (2008) in relation to replicating their study on a cross-country sample. We elaborate on this point in section 5. The effect RATIO has on the log market-to-book ratio is our main focus. The other variables in Equation (1) are included as control variables controlling for other factors which could adversely influence the log market-to-book ratio. In our study the exchange dummy is excluded from the regression model for reasons discussed later. Even though the model contains a constant we will not show the value of this constant in the tables below. The constant is not significant and close to zero, therefore the interpretation of the constant is not relevant.
As in HKS (2008) we estimate three cross-sectional models which we shortly describe below and refer to as "F-M regression", "Pooled regression", and '"Collapsed regression" respectively. The F-M model (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) assumes that the yearly estimates of the coefficients are independent of each other. Essentially you run separate cross-sectional regressions for each year in the sample. Then the means of the annual regression coefficients are computed and the significance of these means are estimated using standard errors that are adjusted for serial correlation. We use the Newey-West adjustment method (Petersen, 2005) . The possible problem with the F-M regression is that it can lead to understated standard errors if there are constant or slowly-decaying effects in the data which is the case of the HKS (2008) study. HKS (2008) therefore also use the Pooled regression.
The Pooled regression (Petersen, 2005) essentially relaxes the assumption of independent errors and assumes that the data have an unobserved fixed firm effect. This method suggests running a pooled regression of all the data and adding year dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the regional / Game hoarding in Europe: Stock-price consequences of local bias? _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 country level. It is assumed that the residuals consist of a firm specific component and an idiosyncratic component which is unique to each observation.
The Collapsed regression is introduced as a final reality check of the standard errors. Residuals of log market-to-book ratios are calculated for each country-year observation including all the variables except RATIO against log market-to-book ratios in separate yearly regressions. The next step is to run a simple panel regression with RATIO and year dummies as the only right-hand side variables and with residual log market-to-book ratios on the left-hand side. Again the standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for serial correlation. Following HKS (2008) we will only use the Collapsed regression results for our basic regression equation.
Our firm data are collected from Orbis (published by Bureau van DIJK) and our country data are collected from Source OECD and Eurostat. HKS (2008) use data collected from broker accounts to prove that the local bias is indeed present and to determine the level of their investigation (the nine regions). The level of investigation in the present study is, however, defined by country borders and the home country bias is well documented 2 to support such a division. As pointed out by Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007) there has been considerable globalization development in the last decades. This is not relevant in a European setting. HKS (2008) winsorize log market-to-book ratios, ROE and R&D-to-sales at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. We assume that this correction should be made to the total pooled sample and make the same correction in our data. HKS (2008) intend to cover both listed and private firms but because of the unavailability of market-to-book ratios of private firms, their sample is restricted to listed firms thus implicitly assuming that the private and public equity markets are completely segmented and/or that the relative size of the two markets is similar across regions. Our sample is also restricted to listed firms.
Besides the dummy for exchange listings (excluded in our study) and the RATIO variable (due to data constraints calculated using GDP instead of personal income), variables are almost identical to the ones specified by HKS (2008). Therefore we also expect the same signs of the coefficients as in HKS (2008). ROE, R&D-to-sales and the R&D dummy are expected to affect the log market-to-book ratio positively while RATIO is expected to affect the log market-to-book ratio negatively. We provide an overview of the RATIO values for the various countries in We provide an overview of the underlying numbers for RATIO in Tables 2 and 3 . Table 2 lists total listed book equity per capita and Table 3 lists GDP per capita. Total listed book equity per capita is the main source (around two thirds) of the variation in RATIO. For the total listed book equity per capita the simple average cross-sectional standard deviation is 54 percent of the simple average crosssectional mean while for the GDP per capita the simple average cross-sectional standard deviation is only 25 percent of the simple average cross-sectional mean. This is also in line with the HKS (2008) study which reports that 69 percent of the variation in RATIO is due to variations in total listed book equity per capita. Table 2 approximately here * * Please insert Table 3 approximately here * Our dependent variable in subsequent regression analysis is the market-to-book ratio. Table 4 presents average market-to-book ratios across countries and years. Again, Luxembourg is an outlier and will be treated as such.
* Please insert
* Please insert Table 4 approximately here * As is evident from the previous tables, Luxembourg is an outlier whether in terms of RATIO (Table 1) , total listed book equity per capita (Table 2) , GDP per capita (Table 3) , or market-to-book ratios (Table   4 ). Furthermore, Luxembourg has only 53 observations in total. In subsequent analysis we therefore choose to exclude Luxembourg.
Empirical results in a replication framework
In Table 5 we show the baseline regression results based on European data. The first thing to notice is that the sign of the coefficient of the RATIO variable is positive. The RATIO coefficient in the F-M regression is significant at the 5 percent level while it is not significant in the pooled and the collapsed regressions. Based on HKS (2008) we expected to find a negative coefficient of RATIO indicating an only-game-in-town effect but instead we find a game-hoarding effect. As expected and as in the HKS (2008) study, the remaining variables exhibit a positive effect on the log market-to-book ratio. The adjusted R-squared numbers of the yearly regressions are lower than they are in the HKS (2008) study but still explaining around 15 percent of the variation in log market-to-book ratios.
* Please insert Table 5 approximately here * Figure 1 shows a graphical illustration at the country level of the relationship between the average market-to-book ratio and the average RATIO. important thing to notice here is that moving from a high RATIO region to a low RATIO region leads to a decrease in the stock price. It is more attractive to be on a market where many other publicly quoted firms are present. So instead of an only-game-in-town effect we find a game-hoarding effect where the negative effect of more intense competition for investors' money is overshadowed by other factors.
HKS (2008) employ numerous robustness tests that generally support their main conclusion. In Table 6 we similarly provide additional controls for our results in Table 5 .
* Please insert Table 6 approximately here * We winsorize log market-to-book ratios, returns on equities (ROE) and R&D to sales ratios at the 1 percent and 99 percent level. After winsorizing at this level many extreme values of ROE, R&D-tosales and log market-to-book ratios are still present in the European data (and probably also in US data, but this is not discussed in the HKS (2008) study). As a robustness test we winsorize at the 2 percent and the 98 percent level. The regression results are shown in Table 6 (B). The RATIO coefficients are slightly more significant at this alternative winsorization level. The coefficients for return on equity, R&D to sales, and the R&D dummy are still positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
The numerous SIC-code dummies may lead to multicollinearity. As a robustness test we reduce the number of SIC-code dummies in the regression by moving from a two-digit to a one-digit industry classification level. The regression results in Table 6 (C) show that the positive RATIO coefficients are more significant at this alternative SIC-code detail level. The coefficients for return on equity, R&D to sales, and the R&D dummy are still positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
Following our literature review we expect small firms to be especially prone to local bias. HKS (2008) find more significant results if they include small firms with equity values below 10 million dollars (7.3 million Euros). We rerun our regressions including small firms and show the results in Table 6 (D). As expected, the RATIO coefficients become more statistically significant. The coefficients for R&D to sales and the R&D dummy are still positive and significant at the 1 percent level but the return on equity coefficient turns negative (although insignificant). Looking at the underlying data, it seems that small firms in the European sample are mainly growth firms with much of their value tied to growth options (negative cash flows and high market-to-book ratio). Thus, small firms with equity values below 10 million dollars (7.3 million Euros) have an average market-to-book ratio of 5.08 compared to an average of 2.34 for the firms with equity values above 7.3 million. HKS (2008) do not show or comment on return on equity and R&D-to-sales numbers in their robustness tests. Overall the RATIO coefficient increases and becomes more significant so it seems that for small firms "crowded" markets lead to even greater valuations.
Just as it makes sense to see the effect of including small firms it may be relevant to investigate the effect of excluding the largest firms. We exclude firms in the top 5 th book equity value percentile in the pooled data (not at the country level). The results of this regression are shown in Table 6 (E). The results are almost similar to the baseline results.
In Table 5 Table 6 (F). As expected, the RATIO coefficients are statistically more significant in this restricted timeframe. The coefficients for return on equity, R&D to sales, and the R&D dummy are still positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
HKS (2008) discuss whether large firms in the sample would skew the results so that RATIO of the regions where the large firms are headquartered would become very high -the "Wal-Mart effect".
Such firms would be widely known and not truly locals. As a robustness test, we exclude the largest firm in each country (e.g. Nokia in Finland and Vodafone in the UK) 6 and rerun our regression. The results of this regression are shown in Table 6 (G). Other than increasing the RATIO coefficient and improving the significance of the coefficients slightly, the "Wal-Mart effect" adjustment in RATIO leads to no new findings. This indicates that even resolving relatively large data problems, in the form of large and possibly dominant firms in certain countries, will not alter the conclusion. The coefficients for return on equity, R&D to sales, and the R&D dummy are still positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
In line with HKS (2008) we exclude the dominant industry in each country. More specifically we exclude all firms in industries that account for more than 10 percent of the total listed book value in a country. Only Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have one or two 2-digit SICcode industries that make up more than 10 percent of the total listed equity of the country. Some excluded industries are due to one large firm in a specific country (e.g. A.P. Moeller Maersk in Denmark and Nokia in Finland). The results of this regression are shown in Table 6 (H). Excluding the dominant industries again increases the RATIO coefficients slightly, but does not change the main conclusion. The coefficients for return on equity, R&D to sales, and the R&D dummy are still positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
The last part of Table 6 further elaborates on the results in Table 5 by including additional control variables. HKS (2008) find that population density and RATIO essentially measure the same thing.
When HKS (2008) include the population density variable in the pooled regression the new variable is statistically significant while RATIO loses its statistical significance. HKS (2008) note that population density has a strong effect on book value per capita and thereby also on RATIO. This is underlined by the general tendency of low RATIO regions to be low population density regions as well. HKS (2008) argue that the source of variation in the RATIO variable could be factors such as better infrastructure and access to a large pool of labour -characteristics of densely populated areas. We rerun the baseline regression including population density. As shown in Table 6 (I) the statistical significance for RATIO is unaltered by the inclusion of the population density variable and this new variable is only statistically significant in the F-M regression. The coefficients for return on equity, R&D to sales, and the R&D dummy are still positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The results imply that population density and RATIO are not "synonyms" in a European context. This further indicates that RATIO is not driven by the same factors in Europe as in the US.
To test for differences in country growth we include the one-year percentage growth of GDP for each country. In the F-M regression, the statistical significance for RATIO is unaltered by the inclusion of the new country growth variable, which is statistically significant in itself. However, in the pooled regression the significance of RATIO disappears when we include the growth variable which in this case is close to being significant. The results of the regression can be seen in Table 6 (J). The coefficients for return on equity, R&D to sales, and the R&D dummy are still positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The results indicate that controlling for growth at the national market slightly reduces the effect of RATIO on stock prices (e.g. by GDP growth having a positive influence on stock prices as well as on the propensity to list firms on the stock exchange).
In Table 6 , we also consider the possibility that the relationship between RATIO and log market-tobook ratio could be non-linear (not discussed in HKS (2008)). We therefore include RATIO-squared as a new independent variable. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 6 (K). The RATIO and the RATIO-squared variables are significant at the 1 percent (F-M regression) and 10 percent (pooled regression) level respectively. Solving for the maximum of the function we find that the relationship between RATIO and log market-to-book ratio is positive for RATIO values below 4.83 for the pooled regression and below 0.70 for the F-M regression. When rerunning the regression including RATIOsquared on data excluding the UK (for the sake of brevity not shown), the RATIO-squared coefficient becomes insignificant. This indicates that the UK is the main reason for the non-linear relation. Almost one third of the sample consists of UK firms and the UK is not an outlier in other terms. Given the magnitude of the turning points and the actual RATIO values in the sample we interpret the relationship between RATIO and log market-to-book ratio as (predominantly) linear.
As a final robustness test we restrict the sample to include firms that are headquartered in countries that have adopted the Euro. Hardouvelis and Malliaropulus (2006) find that the EMU harmonization has made Euro countries more integrated leading up to the single currency implementation. They point out that this should lead to homogeneous valuation of equities in those counties. They show that the UK does not converge with the other countries because it did not adopt the Euro. We restrict our sample to the eleven Euro countries in our sample thus excluding Denmark, Sweden and the UK. The results of the regression, shown in Table 6 (L) show that our main conclusion is not altered. However, the RATIO coefficient does become insignificant in the pooled regression, thus giving a vague indication that our results may be a reflection of some sort of heterogeneity in our full sample. The next section will focus on this issue. HKS (2008) argue that the source of variation in RATIO on the US market could be factors such as better infrastructure and access to a large pool of labor. They base this argument on the clear connection between RATIO and population density. Such a clear connection is not present in the European data and therefore other factors must lie behind the variation of RATIO in the EU15 market.
Empirical results in a cross-country framework
Thus, omitted variable bias may distort our results if the variation in RATIO is driven by different market conditions. HKS (2008) state that "it would probably be naïve to run cross-country versions of our regressions -with country-wide analogs to the RATIO variable -and expect to get similar results".
They point out that an obvious complicating factor is differences in financial development. They exemplify this by arguing that to the extent that differences in investor protection cannot be controlled for such differences "will tend to obscure the negative relationship between RATIO and stock prices that we observe in the U.S. data". In the first place we have taken this argument into consideration by restricting our sample to the "old" EU15 countries thus excluding a number of new EU countries 7 primarily from the former Eastern Europe but also other non-EU European countries 8 . All countries in our sample have a long 9 history of EU membership, which -at least to some extent -accommodates the concerns of replicating the HKS (2008) study in a cross-country framework. However, this may not be sufficient and we will therefore proceed to test whether our results are robust to modifications that further control for cross-country differences in market conditions.
Before such a test, liquidity of the stock markets as a potential candidate for explaining our results should be addressed. The HKS (2008) have relatively small and illiquid stock markets then these countries would exhibit a illiquidity discount (low market-to-book ratio), while countries with high propensity to list firms (high RATIO) that have relatively large and liquid stock markets would exhibit a liquidity premium (high market-to-book ratio).
However, data on turnover velocity of shares do not support this connection 10 .
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) La porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) also produce two indexes addressing investor rights. The first is termed anti-director rights 11 and addresses shareholder rights. The index ranges from 0 to 6 with 0 indicating least shareholder rights and 6 maximal shareholder rights. The second is termed creditor rights 12 and ranges from 0 to 4 with 0 indicating least creditor rights and 4 maximal creditor rights.
11 The index is formed by "adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders' meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders' vote." (La porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)) 12 The index is formed by "adding 1 when (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm: and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of this property pending the resolutions of the reorganization." (La porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998))
To account for the fact that rules may be bent or not be observed, we also use a country corruption perception index published by Transparency International each year. This corruption perception index ranges from 0 to 10 with 0 indicating highly corrupt and 10 indicating highly clean.
We proceed by first explaining the variation in RATIO by origin of law, investor protection, perceived corruption, and Euro adoption and then include the residual RATIO values in our baseline regression instead of RATIO 13 . Table 7 shows the differences between our 14 countries in terms of origin of law, anti-director rights, creditor rights, and corruption perception index. As can be seen from Table 7 * Please insert Table 7 here * In general terms, Table 7 shows that countries with French origin of law have the poorest protection of investors / highest corruption while the UK or countries with Scandinavian origin of law have the 13 Apart from variables in line with work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) we also tried to integrate variables related to differences in home country bias (Sørensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu, 2007) , risk tolerance (Hofstede, 1980) and public versus private equity (based on Orbis data) but none of these additional variables added significantly in explaining the variation in RATIO.
highest protection of investors / least corruption 14 . La Porta et al (1998) show that there is a close connection between origin of law and investor protection. As can be seen from Table 7 , such a close connection also exists between origin of law and perceived corruption with six countries with French origin of law in the bottom of the scale (high corruption) and the three countries with Scandinavian origin of law in the top of the scale (low corruption). Table 8 shows the relation between RATIO (dependent variable) and variables on origin of law, investor protection, perceived corruption and finally non-Euro membership. To reduce problems related to multicollinearity we show two models (Models 1 and 5) that do not contain variables on origin of law and variables on investor protection at the same time as well as more comprehensive models (Models 2, 3 and 4). Table 8 here * Table 8 is based on country level data for 14 countries over 7 years (98 observations) with limited variation in the dependent variable over the years. As such, caution should be taken in not overinterpreting the results. However, based on the results of Table 8 is seems reasonable to suggest that 1) civil law countries (particularly countries with German origin of law) have a lower RATIO than common law countries (default) and that 2) corruption (the corruption perception index) is negatively (positively) related to RATIO. Furthermore, there is some indication that non-Euro membership 14 If we create a crude one-figure scale of investor protection and corruption by summing the three numerical variables in Table 7 we get the following result in ascending order: Greece (French) 7.6; Italy ( Table 8 explain between 27 percent and 61 percent of the variation in RATIO and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
* Please insert
The residual RATIO from each model in Table 8 is used in correspondingly numbered models in Tables 9 and 10 . The residual RATIO should be fully or at least partly cleansed from the influence of differences in origin of law, investor protection, corruption, and Euro adoption between the European countries in our sample and thus represent a more "clean" supply / demand effect variable than the full RATIO. In Table 9 we estimate the exact same models as in Table 5 (i.e. using F-M regressions and pooled regressions), except that we include the residual RATIO as opposed to the full RATIO as an independent variable. * Please insert Table 9 here * Table 9 shows that the elimination of (part of) the differences in origin of law, investor protection, corruption, and Euro adoption between the European countries in our sample reduces the significance of our findings compared to Table 5 . None of the coefficients for the residual RATIO are significant in Game hoarding in Europe: Stock-price consequences of local bias? _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 25 the pooled regression and only three of five coefficients are significant in the F-M regression. The coefficients for return on equity and the R&D variables have the expected signs and are significant at the 1 percent level (just as in Table 5 ). Table 9 represents a very limited support of the game-hoarding effect. Table 8 shows that RATIO is affected by origin of law, investor rights (to some degree), corruption, and Euro membership. However, these variables may not only affect the propensity of firms to be headquartered and listed in a certain country but may also affect the stock price (the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm) more directly. To allow for such a more direct influence on the stock price while still focusing on the effect of the residual RATIO on stock prices, Table 10 replicates tests of Table 9 , except that the independent variables from Table 8 (French origin of law, German origin of law, Scandinavian origin of law, anti-director rights, creditor rights, corruption perception index, and non-Euro membership) are now also included as independent variables in the market-tobook ratio regressions. Table 10 here * Table 10 shows that 1) the elimination of (part of) the differences in origin of law, investor protection, corruption, and Euro adoption between the European countries in our sample together with 2) the inclusion of variables related to these factors reduce the significance of our findings compared to Table   5 . None of the coefficients for the residual RATIO are significant in the pooled regression and only two of five coefficients are significant in the F-M regression. However, the two significant coefficients for the residual RATIO in the F-M regression are now negative thus lending some support to an only-game-in-town effect. The coefficients for return on equity and the R&D variables have the expected signs and are significant at the 1 percent level (just as in Table 5 ).
The new independent variables in Table 10 (French origin of law, German origin of law, Scandinavian origin of law, anti-director rights, creditor rights, corruption perception index, and non-Euro membership) show few significant and direction-consistent coefficients. Two exceptions are German origin of law and anti-director rights. German origin of law is associated with a low stock price whereas anti-director rights is positively related to stock prices. It is interesting to note the clear positive relationship between anti-director rights and stock prices (Table 10) while at the same time noting the primarily insignificant connection between anti-director rights and RATIO (Table 8) .
Whereas stock prices clearly benefit from anti-director rights, the same is not true on the propensity to list firms. It is also interesting to note that while the corruption perception index and RATIO seem to have a strong positive relationship (Table 8) , the same is not true for the corruption perception index and stock prices (although all coefficients are positive). In relation to our primary focus, the effect of RATIO on stock prices, Tables 9 and 10 show that once we account for differences in origin of law, investor protection, corruption and/or Euro membership, the significant support for the game-hoarding effect found in Table 5 make the anti-director rights variable more significant in explaining RATIO in Table 8 and raises R 2 , 2) make the residual RATIO consistently positive in Table 9 and slightly more significant, and 3) indicate a more positive impact on share prices from the anti-director rights variable in Table 10 , but does not affect our main conclusions.
Conclusions
This study consists of two major parts. First, a replication of the HKS (2008) study using European data (EU15) which shows that the price of a stock in a European context is increasing in the ratio of the aggregated book value of listed firms in a country to the GDP in the same country (a game-hoarding effect) as opposed to a negative relation (an only-game-in-town effect) found in the HKS (2008) study that uses US data. Second, an expansion of the HKS (2008) study in a cross-country framework which shows that once we control for differences related to origin of law, investor rights, corruption, and Euro adaption, the European data support neither a game-hoarding effect nor an only-game-in-town effect.
HKS (2008) find that arbitrage opportunities are limited whether looking at an investor short selling stocks in the Deep South region (low RATIO) and buying stocks in the Middle Atlantic region (high RATIO) or looking at a firm moving headquarters to a region with a lower RATIO. In a European context, the investor would consider short selling stocks in the UK (high RATIO) and buying stocks in Austria and Portugal (low RATIO). However, even if the magnitude of the price disparity is similar in the US and the European market (although with reverse relations to RATIO), the price disparity in the European market is due to "valuable" -valuable for investors and/or firms -differences in law of origin, investor protection, corruption and Euro adaption. As we do not find a convincing case for neither the game-hoarding effect nor the only-game-in-town effect after controlling for such differences, arbitrage opportunities seem to be non-existent in the European case.
Our results are important in understanding the concept of local bias when going from an intra-country framework to a cross-country framework. Our simple replication of the HKS (2008) study shows a local bias, a game-hoarding effect, which is difficult to explain using a narrow supply / demand framework (an increased supply is associated with an increased price). This seemingly awkward result is, however, due to omitted variable bias. We highlight the necessity of taking into account differences in legal, cultural and economic settings when investigating local bias in a cross-country framework.
Properly accounting for such differences is important in our study of EU15 countries and would be even more important -and difficult -if the present study is extended to samples of countries that exhibit more heterogeneity than the EU15 sample. Table 1 Summary Table 2 Summary statistics for total listed book equity per capita 2001-2007
The entries are values of total listed book equity per capita in Euro in a given country. For the three non-Euro countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the UK) exchange rates as of the end of December has been used for conversion. The time-series means and standard deviations of total listed book equity per capita are reported in the right hand side of the The entries are values of GDP per capita in Euro in a given country. For the three non-Euro countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the UK) exchange rates as of the end of December has been used for conversion. The time-series means and standard deviations of GDP per capita are reported in the right hand side of the 6,198 6,373 6,439 6,676 6,967 7,610 7,868 Table 4 Summary statistics for market-to-book ratios 2001-2007
The entries are values of market-to-book ratios in a given country. The time-series means and standard deviations of market-to-book ratios are reported in the right hand side of the Table 5 RATIO and stock prices
This table presents results of Fama Macbeth (F-M), pooled, and collapsed regression analysis. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm. Only firms with equity larger than 7.3 million Euro are included. Luxembourg is excluded. The independent variables are RATIO, the ratio of total listed book equity to GDP of the country in which the firm is headquartered, along with the firm's return on equity (ROE), R&D to sales, and dummy variables which equal one if the firm reports R&D expenditures and 0 otherwise. Log market-to-book ratio, return on equity (ROE) and R&D to sales ratios are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent level. Also included in the regressions (but not shown) are a set of two-digit SIC industry dummies. Entries are the coefficients for independent variables, the R-squared of the cross-sectional regressions by year, and the number of observations. Also reported are the time-series means of these yearly coefficients and the fraction of the years in which the regression coefficients have the predicted signs. Standard deviations are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. The last four lines report the results from 1) a single pooled regression in which the standard errors are clustered at the country level and 2) a collapsed regression in which there is only one averaged observation on residual log market-to-book ratios for each country-year cell, and in which the standard errors are again clustered at the country level. In the pooled regression, there are year dummies (not shown). In the collapsed regression, there are only year dummies in addition to the RATIO variable. Statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. Table 6 RATIO and stock prices, robustness tests
This table presents robustness tests of the Fama Macbeth (F-M) regression and the pooled regression presented in Table 5 . The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm. Only firms with equity larger than 7.3 million Euro are included. Luxembourg is excluded. The independent variables are RATIO, the ratio of total listed book equity to GDP of the country in which the firm is headquartered, along with the firm's return on equity (ROE), R&D to sales, and dummy variables which equal one if the firm reports R&D expenditures and 0 otherwise. Log market-to-book ratio, return on equity (ROE) and R&D to sales ratios are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent level. Also included in the regressions (but not shown) are a set of two-digit SIC industry dummies. Entries are the coefficients for independent variables. Further independent variables are population density (population of country divided by size of country in thousand square kilometers), GDP growth (GDP growth for each year for each country), and RATIO squared. Standard deviations are reported below the coefficients. In the pooled regression, there are year dummies (not shown). Statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. This table presents results of regression analysis. The dependent variable is RATIO, the ratio of total listed book equity to GDP of the country in which the firm is headquartered. The independent variables are 1) dummies for French origin of law, German origin of law, and Scandinavian origin of law with common law as default (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1998); 2) anti-director rights and creditor rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1998) where antidirector rights is measured on a scale from 0 to 6 with 0 indicating least anti-director rights and creditor rights is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 with 0 indicating least creditor rights; 3) corruption perception index 2007 as published by Transparency International and measured on a scale from 0 to 10 with 0 indicating highly corrupt and 10 indicating highly clean; and 4) a dummy for non-Euro membership (Denmark, Sweden, and the UK). Year dummies are included in the regression but now shown. Entries are the coefficients for independent variables. Standard deviations are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. Table 9 Residual RATIO and stock prices, a cross-country framework
This table presents results of Fama Macbeth (F-M) and pooled regression analysis. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm. Only firms with equity larger than 7.3 million Euro are included. Luxembourg is excluded. The independent variables are residual RATIO, the residual ratio from the corresponding models in Table 8 , along with the firm's return on equity (ROE), R&D to sales, and dummy variables which equal one if the firm reports R&D expenditures and 0 otherwise. Log market-to-book ratio, return on equity (ROE) and R&D to sales ratios are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent level. Also included in the regressions (but not shown) are a set of two-digit SIC industry dummies. Entries are the coefficients for independent variables, the R-squared of the pooled regressions and the number of observations. Standard deviations are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. In the pooled regression, there are year dummies (not shown). Statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. F-M) and pooled regression analysis. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm. Only firms with equity larger than 7.3 million Euro are included. Luxembourg is excluded. The independent variables are residual RATIO, the residual ratio from the corresponding models in Table 8 , along with the firm's return on equity (ROE), R&D to sales, and dummy variables which equal one if the firm reports R&D expenditures and 0 otherwise. Log market-to-book ratio, return on equity (ROE) and R&D to sales ratios are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent level. Also included in the regressions (but not shown) are a set of two-digit SIC industry dummies. Further independent variables are 1) dummies for French origin of law, German origin of law, and Scandinavian origin of law with common law as default (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1998); 2) anti-director rights and creditor rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1998) where anti-director rights is measured on a scale from 0 to 6 with 0 indicating least anti-director rights and creditor rights is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 with 0 indicating least creditor rights; 3) corruption perception index 2007 as published by Transparency International and measured on a scale from 0 to 10 with 0 indicating highly corrupt and 10 indicating highly clean; and 4) a dummy for non-Euro membership (Denmark, Sweden, and the UK). Entries are the coefficients for independent variables, the R-squared of the pooled regressions and the number of observations. Standard deviations are reported below the coefficients in parentheses.
In the pooled regression, there are year dummies (not shown). Statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
